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Article 
Show and Tell?:                                                       
Students’ Personal Lives, Schools, and Parents 
EMILY GOLD WALDMAN 
 Public schools learn about their students’ personal lives in many 
ways. Some are passive: a teacher observes a student kissing someone, or 
overhears a conversation among friends. But schools also engage in more 
active information-gathering about students’ personal lives, through 
surveys and informal conversations between students and teachers, 
administrators, school psychologists, counselors, coaches, and other 
personnel. This Article explores the competing privacy considerations that 
result from such encounters. Once schools have learned highly personal 
information about their students, does it violate those students’ privacy 
rights to disclose that information to their parents? Or does keeping the 
information secret violate the parents’ constitutional right to direct the 
upbringing of their children, often framed as a privacy right of its own? 
And what are the limits on schools’ ability to probe for such information in 
the first place?  
This Article brings together the parallel lines of cases addressing these 
questions, showing how students’ and parents’ privacy interests converge 
in the context of schools’ extraction of students’ personal information, only 
to be pitted against each other regarding the disclosure of such 
information. Moreover, it explores the underlying normative question that 
links the extraction and disclosure issues:  how should schools approach 
their—to some extent, inevitable—role in students’ personal and family 
lives? This Article argues that recognizing stronger limitations on schools’ 
ability to probe into students’ personal lives, while giving schools broad 
discretion as to how to handle such information provided that it has been 
legitimately obtained, is not only consistent with both of the constitutional 
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EMILY GOLD WALDMAN∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Charlene Nguon was a sixteen-year-old high school junior when her 
principal told her mother that she was being suspended for engaging in 
“inappropriate public displays of affection” with her girlfriend, thereby 
informing her mother that she was gay.1 “My mom picked me up from 
school and her eyes were all watery,” Charlene later recalled. “I just went 
to my room and cried. We didn’t talk about it for about a week.”2 Later, 
however, Charlene and her mother not only spoke but took action. 
Charlene, through her mother, sued her principal, alleging that he had 
violated her constitutionally protected right to privacy by disclosing her 
sexual orientation to her mother.3 After a bench trial, a California district 
court ultimately ruled against Charlene’s claim.4 
During the very same week that Charlene lost her case, another 
sixteen-year-old girl located across the country also lost her legal challenge 
to the way the state had handled information about her sexual behavior. 
Her claim, however, came from the opposite perspective. Melissa 
Anspach, who had gone to a public health center for the morning-after pill, 
alleged that the center’s employees had violated her constitutional rights to 
bodily integrity and parental guidance by giving her the tablets without 
first apprising her parents of the situation.5 Melissa’s parents, through 
whom she brought the lawsuit, also brought their own claim, alleging that 
their familial privacy rights—i.e., their right to direct the upbringing of 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002; B.A., Yale 
University, 1999. This paper was the official selection from the “Call for Papers” held by the 
Association of American Law Schools Section on Defamation and Privacy in connection with its 
program, entitled “Under the Parental Gaze in the 21st Century: Children’s Privacy Rights Against 
Their Parents,” at the January 2014 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. I 
thank the other speakers at this program—Gaia Bernstein, Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Pamela Laufer-
Ukeles, Andrea Matwyshyn, Paul Ohm, and Laura Rosenbury—for their helpful and thought-
provoking comments during the event. 
1 Nguon v. Wolf, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1181–83, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
2 Tamar Lewin, Openly Gay Student’s Lawsuit Over Privacy Will Proceed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2005, at A21. 
3 Nguon, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1179. 
4 Id. at 1198–99. 
5 Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 258–60 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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their daughter—had been infringed by the center’s behavior.6 The Third 
Circuit, however, rejected the Anspachs’ case in full.7 
These two lawsuits, taken in juxtaposition, illustrate some difficult 
questions raised when government entities—most often, but not 
exclusively, public schools—learn highly personal information about 
minors, particularly adolescents. Does disclosing such information to their 
parents violate the minors’ privacy rights? Or does keeping it secret violate 
the parents’ constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children, 
often framed as a privacy right of its own? In both of the above cases, the 
state ultimately won, suggesting that government entities have a fair degree 
of discretion when deciding whether to disclose personal information or 
not. But what are the limits of that discretion? When does disclosing—or 
not disclosing—a minor’s personal information to his or her parents violate 
the Constitution? And what are the limits on the state’s ability to probe for 
such information in the first place?   
This Article explores the ways that minors’ and parents’ constitutional 
privacy interests converge and diverge across these questions, focusing on 
public schools’ extraction (through surveys, informal questioning, and 
other means) and disclosure of information about students’ personal lives. 
The extraction and disclosure issues, while separately analyzed by 
scholars, have rarely been considered together, especially from a 
constitutional perspective.8 But stepping back to consider how the 
extraction and disclosure questions relate to each other is illuminating, for 
several reasons.   
First, on a practical level, the same school-student interaction 
surrounding a student’s personal information can raise issues of both 
extraction and disclosure. For example, the Fifth Circuit recently 
                                                                                                                          
6 Id. at 258–59. 
7 Id. at 274. 
8 Regarding schools’ extraction of information, see generally Kathleen Conn, Counterpoint: 
Parents’ Right to Direct Their Children’s Education and Student Sex Surveys, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 139 
(2009); Tara Dahl, Surveys in America’s Classrooms: How Much Do Parents Really Know? 37 J.L. & 
EDUC. 143 (2008); Maxine Eichner, Counterpoint and Rebuttal: School Surveys and Children’s 
Education: The Argument for Shared Authority Between Parents and the States, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 459 
(2009). On schools’ disclosure of such information, see, e.g., Caitlin M. Cullitan, Please Don’t Tell My 
Mom: A Minor’s Right to Informational Privacy, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 417 (2011); Adam J. Kretz, The 
Right to Sexual Orientation Privacy: Strengthening Protections for Minors Who Are ‘Outed’ in 
Schools, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 381 (2013); Melissa Prober, Note, Please Don’t Tell My Parents: The 
Validity of School Policies Mandating Parental Notification of a Student’s Pregnancy, 71 BROOKLYN 
L. REV. 557 (2005). A few scholars have looked at both extraction and disclosure issues regarding 
students’ personal information in the context of various federal statutes, including the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act and the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment, but they have 
largely focused on the statutory rather than the constitutional issues. See generally Lynn M. Daggett, 
Student Privacy and the Protection of Pupil Rights Act as Amended by No Child Left Behind, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 51 (2008); Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Education Informational Privacy 
for Public Schoolchildren, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1158 (2006). 
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rejected—in a two to one split—a student’s claim that her public school 
coaches violated her constitutional rights by interrogating her about her 
sexual orientation and then “outing” her to her mother.9     
Second, at a doctrinal level, the extraction and disclosure issues each 
implicate the same two constitutional interests, both of which stem from 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and are usually framed in 
privacy terms: (1) the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters 
(often referred to as the right to informational privacy)10 and (2) the 
parental interest in directing the upbringing of one’s children (often 
referred to as the right to “familial” privacy).11 What is striking is that 
these two privacy rights generally dovetail when it comes to schools’ 
extraction of students’ personal information—which can infringe both 
students’ informational privacy and their parents’ familial privacy—only to 
be pitted against each other regarding the disclosure of that information to 
parents. Looking at the extraction and disclosure questions together, then, 
is a useful lens for considering the scope and relationship of these two 
privacy rights. I suggest that where the two privacy rights converge, as is 
often the case in the context of extracting students’ personal information, 
the constitutional limitations on schools should be strong. By contrast, 
where the two privacy interests diverge, as in the disclosure context, 
schools should have more room to exercise their own discretion, and 
constitutional liability for disclosure or non-disclosure to a student’s 
parents should attach only in extreme circumstances.   
  Finally, the extraction and disclosure issues raise a common core of 
normative concerns. What links them is the underlying question of how 
schools should approach their role in students’ personal and family lives. 
Recognizing clearer limitations on schools’ ability to extract students’ 
personal non-academic information, while giving them broad discretion as 
to how to handle such information provided that it has been legitimately 
obtained, is not only consistent with both of the constitutional privacy 
interests at stake, but is also good policy.   
This Article proceeds in three main parts. Part II discusses schools’ 
extraction of students’ personal non-academic information. Such 
information can conceivably relate to a wide range of topics, but in 
practice, it most often involves students’ attitudes and behaviors regarding 
sex and drugs. Although there is a federal statute regarding schools’ ability 
to extract such personal information through surveys and other 
evaluations—the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment12—this statute 
does not include an express private right of action and has not been held 
                                                                                                                          
9 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 499–501, 510 (5th Cir. 2013). 
10 See infra Part II.A. 
11 See infra Part II.B. 
12 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (2012). 
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enforceable under Section 1983.13 The litigation in this area has therefore 
centered on the constitutional front. I examine the privacy-based 
challenges to schools’ extraction of this sort of information, exploring how 
they can be framed in both informational privacy and familial privacy 
terms, and arguing that although there are certain tensions within each 
formulation, they generally converge in a way that points toward strong 
protection.   
Part III then addresses schools’ disclosure of students’ personal 
information to their parents. Here, the two constitutional privacy interests 
are starker, but typically point in opposite directions. Analogizing to the 
space for “play in the joints” between the mandates imposed by the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, I argue that there 
should be similar room for “play in the joints” here: in most situations, 
schools should be able to use their best judgment as to whether to disclose 
students’ personal information to parents, provided that they have 
legitimately obtained the information and are not motivated by malice, 
without fearing liability under an informational privacy theory if they 
disclose or under a parental privacy theory if they do not.   
Part IV explores the regime that my proposed approach would create. I 
suggest that it will beneficially reduce the potential for schools to 
forcefully insert themselves into the family dynamic and disrupt the parent-
child relationship.   
II.  EXTRACTION OF STUDENTS’ INFORMATION 
Schools learn students’ personal information in many ways. Some are 
simply passive: a teacher observes a student kissing someone, or overhears 
a conversation among friends. But schools also engage in more active 
information-gathering about students’ personal lives, through both surveys 
and more informal encounters between students and teachers, 
administrators, school psychologists, counselors, coaches, and other 
personnel. The federal Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (PPRA), 
originally passed in 1974 and most recently amended in 2002 as part of the 
No Child Left Behind Act, states that students should not be “required” to 
“submit to a survey, analysis, or evaluation that reveals information” 
concerning the student’s or family’s political beliefs, family problems, sex 
behavior or attitudes, and other personal matters, without prior parental 
                                                                                                                          
13 See, e.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that 
the parties had dismissed their Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment claim in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), that the analogous Family 
Educational Records Privacy Act was not enforceable); see also Daggett, supra note 8, at 108–09 
(explaining that in light of Gonzaga, “it seems clear that PPRA claims are similarly non-actionable 
under Section 1983” and adding that “the administrative enforcement option is fairly toothless”). 
 2015] SHOW AND TELL?: STUDENTS’ PERSONAL LIVES, SCHOOLS, AND PARENTS 705 
consent.14 Yet the PPRA has played a minimal role in cases challenging 
schools’ extraction of students’ personal information. Not only is it unclear 
whether the PPRA’s reference to surveys, analyses, and evaluations 
encompasses school personnel’s informal interactions with students,15 but 
the PPRA has also been interpreted to lack any private means of 
enforcement.16 
Accordingly, students’ and parents’ challenges to schools’ extraction 
of their information have centered on constitutional claims. Such lawsuits 
sound in an informational privacy theory, a familial privacy theory, or 
both. But both of these privacy rights are notoriously murky—and neither 
is perfectly on point here.   
A.  Informational Privacy 
1. The Informational Privacy Right: An Overview 
The first key challenge to a public school’s extraction of a student’s 
personal information is an informational privacy claim, typically brought 
by parents on the minor student’s behalf. The concept of an informational 
privacy right stems from the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Whalen v. 
                                                                                                                          
14 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(b) (2012). The exact language covers information concerning  
(1) political affiliations or beliefs of the student or the student’s parent; (2) mental or 
psychological problems of the student or the student’s family; (3) sex behavior or 
attitudes; (4) illegal, anti-social, self-incriminating, or demeaning behavior; (5) 
critical appraisals of other individuals with whom respondents have close family 
relationships; (6) legally recognized privileged or analogous relationships, such as 
those of lawyers, physicians, and ministers; (7) religious practices, affiliations, or 
beliefs of the student or student’s parent; or (8) income (other than that required by 
law to determine eligibility for participation in a program or for receiving financial 
assistance under such program). 
Id. §§ 1232h(b)(1)–(8). In addition to stating that prior parental consent is needed for “required” 
surveys, id. § 1232h(b), the PPRA goes on to provide notice and opt-out rights for parents with respect 
to all surveys that address the topics above. Id. at §§ 1232h(c)(2)(A)–(C). As Daggett describes, the 
PPRA does not make clear precisely what counts as a “required” survey. Daggett, supra note 8, at 122–
23.   
15 See, e.g., Daggett, supra note 8, at 91 (“It seems clear that use of a formal instrument qualifies 
as a survey or evaluation. What about an interview of a student by a guidance counselor to help identify 
causes of a student’s academic difficulty?”).     
16 See C.N., 430 F.3d at 171 n.13 (explaining that parties dropped their Protection of Pupil Rights 
Amendment claims in light of the decision that no right to private action exists under the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act). Nor does the better-known Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA) play a role here. In addition to lacking a private right of action, FERPA does not 
focus on the collection of information from students, but rather on the confidentiality of educational 
records. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); see also Daggett, supra note 8, at 61 (“FERPA requires schools to 
keep what they know about students confidential; PPRA keeps schools from learning certain 
information about students in the first place.”). For purposes of this Article, which focuses on K-12 
public education, FERPA is also not relevant to Part III—disclosure—because it does not grant any 
privacy rights to children under the age of eighteen. 
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Roe.17 There, the Court observed:  
The cases sometimes characterized as protecting “privacy” 
have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. 
One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence 
in making certain kinds of important decisions.18 
The latter privacy strand, sometimes captured by the term “decisional 
privacy,” encompasses familiar issues including contraception, abortion, 
refusal of medical treatment, and—as discussed further below—
childrearing.19 But the former strand, now often referred to as 
“informational privacy,” has been much less developed by the Supreme 
Court. The Whalen Court seemed to endorse the concept that some sort of 
constitutional right to informational privacy exists, but the Court never 
described it in detail or articulated a standard for determining whether it 
had been violated. Instead, the Court simply held that the challenged 
governmental action—New York’s practice of keeping a centralized 
database with information about prescription drug-users—did not violate 
this right because there were safeguards against further public disclosure, 
and because requiring the disclosure of private information to the New 
York Department of Health itself was not “meaningfully distinguishable 
from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated 
with many facets of health care.”20   
Since Whalen, the Supreme Court has directly addressed the 
informational privacy concept in just two cases: Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services21 and NASA v. Nelson.22 The Nixon Court easily rejected 
former President Nixon’s claim that his constitutional right to privacy was 
violated by the requirement of the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act that he release his presidential papers and tape recordings 
for archival review and screening.23 The Court explained that Nixon’s 
privacy interest was “weaker than that found wanting in . . . Whalen” and 
was outweighed by the public interest in preservation of presidential 
materials.24 In NASA, decided in 2011, the Court returned to the 
informational privacy concept, but again declined to develop it—or even to 
explicitly endorse it. Instead, the Court simply “assume[d], without 
deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort 
                                                                                                                          
17 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
18 Id. at 598–600 (internal footnotes omitted). 
19 DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (2d ed. 2006). 
20 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601–04. 
21 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
22 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
23 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455–57, 465. 
24 Id. at 458–59. 
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mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.”25 It then concluded that the government 
action at issue—conducting background checks of NASA contract 
employees—did not violate that right.26   
Given the Supreme Court’s lack of elaboration as to the informational 
privacy right, lower courts have fleshed it out on their own. As the NASA 
Court noted, “[s]tate and lower federal courts have offered a number of 
different interpretations of Whalen and Nixon over the years.”27 Every 
circuit except for the D.C. Circuit has now recognized a constitutional right 
to informational privacy, but the scope of protection varies. While the 
Sixth Circuit has held that any such right should only apply to information 
relating to those rights “that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty,’”28 most other circuits have adopted broader 
views. The Tenth Circuit, for instance, has described the informational 
privacy right as generally “protect[ing] the individual from governmental 
inquiry into matters in which it does not have a legitimate and proper 
interest.”29 The Third Circuit has also taken a more “encompassing 
view,”30 looking at whether the information is “within an individual’s 
reasonable expectations of confidentiality.”31   
The circuits also differ as to how they measure infringement of the 
informational privacy right. They generally use a sort of balancing test, 
weighing the governmental justification for the invasion against the 
strength of the privacy interest at stake, in various formulations. The Tenth 
Circuit, for instance, requires the state to show a “compelling state 
interest” for the privacy invasion,32 and the Seventh Circuit has held that 
the informational privacy right “is defeasible only upon proof of a strong 
public interest in access to or dissemination of the information.”33 The 
Third Circuit has adopted a multi-factor balancing test that looks at  
the type of record requested, the information it does or might 
contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent 
                                                                                                                          
25 NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 751. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 756 n.9. 
28 Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 260 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting J. P. v. DeSanti, 
653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981)); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t., 305 F.3d 
566, 574 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting J. P., 653 F.2d at 1090). 
29 Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988). 
30 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). 
31 Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 112 (3d Cir. 1987). The 
Seventh Circuit has used similar language, describing the informational privacy right as encompassing 
“medical, sexual, financial, and perhaps other categories of highly personal information—information 
that most people are reluctant to disclose to strangers.” Wolfe v. Schaefer, 619 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
32 Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1119 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sheets v. Salt Lake 
Cnty., 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
33 Wolfe, 619 F.3d at 785. 
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nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the 
relationship in which the record was generated, the adequacy 
of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree 
of need for access, and whether there is an express statutory 
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable 
public interest militating toward access.34   
Courts similarly have varying approaches as to whether minors possess 
informational privacy rights. All three circuits that have explicitly 
addressed the issue—the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—concluded that 
minors have such rights, but the scope of protection varies by circuit.35 The 
Third and Ninth Circuits essentially use the same balancing framework for 
analyzing informational privacy claims regardless of whether the claimant 
is an adult or minor.36 The Tenth Circuit, by contrast, has adopted a 
different test for analyzing minors’ informational privacy claims. Instead 
of applying the “compelling state interest” standard that it uses for adults’ 
informational privacy claims, it looks at whether the government action 
“serve[s] ‘any significant state interest . . . that is not present in the case of 
an adult.’”37  
Finally, the case law is also murky as to whether the informational 
privacy right applies to governmental acquisition of personal information 
or whether it solely covers the further disclosure of such information—a 
crucial question when it comes to public schools’ extraction of students’ 
personal information, as discussed below.38 The Supreme Court’s brief 
                                                                                                                          
34 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit 
has followed this approach. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 
2002) (analyzing privacy rights using the same multi-factor balancing test). 
35 For a thorough discussion of this topic, see Helen L. Gilbert, Comment, Minors’ Constitutional 
Right to Informational Privacy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1382–88 (2007) (explaining the circuit 
courts’ different approaches to assessing minors’ informational privacy claims and arguing that each of 
these approaches fail to protect “minors’ particular vulnerabilities”). 
36 See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
constitutional right to privacy extends to minors, but is subject to the same limitations as the privacy 
right of adults); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., 307 F.3d at 789–90 (refusing to overturn Arizona’s 
parental consent abortion statute by reasoning that the statute reasonably preserve’s a pregnant minor’s 
confidential information). Of course, the age of the plaintiff may be taken into account in conducting 
the balancing inquiry, which is very fact-specific.   
37 Aid for Women, 441 F.3d at 1119 (alteration in original) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977)). 
38 For a discussion of this distinction in the related context of privacy-based torts, the availability 
of which vary by state, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 
2012, 2032–33 (2010). Strahilevitz describes and largely rejects the distinction drawn by William 
Prosser between the torts of “intrusion upon seclusion” (which is acquisition-based) and “public 
disclosure of private facts” (which is disclosure-based). “There is no reason why the torts for intrusion 
upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts should look different from each other,” 
Strahilevitz argues. Id. at 2032. “The keys to each tort are whether the defendant’s actions intruded 
upon private information and whether the defendant’s conduct violated existing norms of social 
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discussions of informational privacy have focused on the disclosure 
context. When the Supreme Court first articulated the privacy right at stake 
in Whalen, it framed it as the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.”39 And the Whalen Court relied on a distinction between 
governmental acquisition and disclosure of personal information in its 
holding, emphasizing that the patient information in question would only 
be received by a state agency and not shared with the public.40 Similarly, in 
NASA, the Supreme Court stated that one weakness of the plaintiffs’ 
informational privacy claim was that they were “attack[ing] only the 
Government’s collection of information,” without pointing to a genuine 
threat of further disclosure.41   
Lower courts, however, have sometimes been receptive to 
informational privacy claims that are based on governmental information-
acquisition alone. In Thorne v. City of El Secundo,42 for example, the Ninth 
Circuit allowed an informational privacy claim to proceed when it 
stemmed solely from the governments’ extraction of a municipal 
employee’s sexual history (through polygraph questioning).43 Indeed, the 
Ninth Circuit has stated that the informational privacy right covers 
situations where an individual does not want to “disclose highly sensitive 
information to the government.”44 Similarly, in Eastwood v. Departmentt 
of Corrections,45 the Tenth Circuit approved an informational privacy 
claim brought by a government employee whose employers extensively 
questioned her about her sexual history, explaining that the privacy right 
“is implicated when an individual is forced to disclose information [to the 
government] regarding personal sexual matters.”46    
2. The Informational Privacy Right: Public Schools’ Extraction of 
Students’ Personal Information  
The informational privacy construct becomes even more complicated 
when applied to public schools’ extraction of students’ personal 
information. Not only do the basic questions remain about the scope of this 
right and whether it covers governmental acquisition as well as disclosure 
                                                                                                                          
conduct—in other words, whether the conduct was highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. I return 
to this distinction infra pages 715–16 and 725. 
39 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (emphasis added). 
40 Id. at 594, 601–02. 
41 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2011). 
42 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983).   
43 Id. at 470. 
44 Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 789–90 (2002) (stating that the 
informational privacy right “applies both when an individual chooses not to disclose highly sensitive 
information to the government and when an individual seeks assurance that such information will not 
be made public”).   
45 846 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1988). 
46 Id. at 629, 631. 
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of information, but the unique relationship between schools and their 
students adds another layer of complexity. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly set the level of protection for students’ constitutional rights 
differently from the baseline standard, often ratcheting protection down47 
and occasionally ratcheting it up.48 Given the Supreme Court’s scant 
attention to the informational privacy right altogether, the Court has said 
nothing about how this right should play out in schools. Lower courts, in 
turn, have not articulated a clear framework for whether, and when, 
students can have a viable informational privacy claim arising solely from 
schools’ extraction of their information. 
A pair of Third Circuit cases—both involving informational privacy-
based challenges to schools’ extraction of students’ information, but 
reaching opposite results—illustrates the key issues here. In the first case, 
Gruenke v. Seip,49 seventeen-year-old Leah Gruenke and her mother sued 
the school’s varsity swim coach who, after suspecting that Leah was 
pregnant, swung into action.50 The coach asked his female assistant to 
approach Leah about whether she was pregnant, followed up himself with 
Leah to try to discuss sex and pregnancy with her, and urged the school 
guidance counselor and nurse to talk to her.51 Throughout these 
interactions, Leah denied being pregnant.52 The coach also discussed 
whether Leah might be pregnant with the mothers of fellow swim team 
members and allegedly encouraged swim team members to convince Leah 
to take a pregnancy test, possibly even suggesting that Leah would be 
                                                                                                                          
47 In the contexts of students’ First Amendment speech rights, Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, the 
Supreme Court has developed tests that provide less protection for minors than that accorded to the 
general population. The Supreme Court’s student speech framework, comprising Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. 393 (2007), Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), Bethel School 
District Number 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), allows schools to restrict speech that would 
otherwise be protected, such as speech that is plainly offensive or that could reasonably be interpreted 
as encouraging illegal drug use. Similarly, for illustrations of this ratcheting-down in the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment contexts, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332–34, 340–41 (1985) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to school authorities’ searches of students, but that such 
searches—rather than requiring probable cause and a warrant—need only satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s “fundamental command” of reasonableness, because “the school setting requires some 
easing of the restrictions”), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 583 (1975) (holding that school 
suspensions implicate students’ procedural due process rights, but that only the rudimentary aspects of 
due process—notice and an informal hearing—are required, because “further formalizing the 
suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as 
a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process”).   
48 In the Establishment Clause context, the Supreme Court has suggested that students’ youth and 
impressionability can heighten the potential for a violation. See infra p. 716. 
49 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000). 
50 Id. at 290. 
51 Id. at 296. 
52 Id.  
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removed from certain swim events if she did not.53 Leah ultimately agreed 
to take a test, which was positive (though later that same day, she took two 
additional tests, both of which were negative).54 She then informed her 
mother—with whom the coach had never communicated—about what was 
happening.55 Her mother scheduled her for a doctor’s appointment, at 
which point Leah learned that she was actually almost six months 
pregnant.56   
In their lawsuit, Leah and her mother claimed that the coach’s actions 
had violated both Leah’s right to informational privacy and their collective 
right to family privacy, along with her Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from illegal searches (here, the administration of a pregnancy test).57 
Although their familial privacy claim failed, as discussed below,58 the 
Third Circuit allowed Leah’s closely linked Fourth Amendment and 
informational privacy claims to go forward.59 “[A] school cannot compel a 
student to take a pregnancy test absent a legitimate health concern about a 
possible pregnancy and the exercise of some discretion,” the court wrote, 
explaining its Fourth Amendment ruling.60 Moreover, the circumstances 
surrounding the coach’s extraction of Leah’s information—such as having 
her teammates administer the test and discussing it with his assistant 
coaches—meant that Leah’s claim “f[ell] squarely within the contours of 
the recognized right of one to be free from disclosure of personal matters,” 
i.e., the informational privacy right.61 The Gruenke court thus left open 
whether, had the coach not involved anyone else in his attempt to 
determine Leah’s pregnancy status but had only questioned her himself—
that is, had there been solely extraction of information, without any 
disclosure—she still would have had a viable informational privacy claim 
against him.   
In the subsequent case of C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education,62 the 
Third Circuit again left open whether students can ever have cognizable 
informational privacy claims arising solely from public schools’ extraction 
                                                                                                                          
53 Id. Leah alleged that her teammates told her that the coach would take her off the relay team 
unless she took the pregnancy test, although the teammates and coach denied this. Id.  
54 Id. at 296–97. 
55 Id. at 297. 
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 See infra Part II.B.2 (providing an overview of parental interests in the right to familial privacy 
and addressing familial privacy rights in relation to public schools’ extraction of students’ personal 
information). 
59 Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 295. 
60 Id. at 301. 
61 Id. at 302–03. 
62 430 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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of information.63 There, the school district administered a survey entitled 
“Profiles of Student Life: Attitudes and Behaviors” to students in the 
seventh through twelfth grades.64 The survey, which was supposed to be 
voluntary and anonymous, asked students extremely personal questions 
about drug and alcohol use, sexual activity, experience with physical 
violence, suicide attempts, personal associations and relationships, and 
their views on matters of public interest.65 The 156 questions included, for 
instance, whether the student had ever had sex, whether they liked and felt 
proud of themselves, whether their parents would be upset if they drank 
alcohol, and whether the student agreed or disagreed with the statement 
“my parents often tell me they love me.”66 After doubt emerged as to 
whether the survey had actually been administered in a voluntary and 
anonymous manner, three parents filed suit on behalf of themselves and 
their children, alleging informational and familial privacy violations.67   
Even though the Third Circuit concluded that “[a] myriad of direct and 
indirect evidence coalesces to support the reasonable inference that the 
survey, as actually administered, was involuntary,” it still rejected the 
plaintiffs’ informational privacy claim.68 In so doing, the court applied its 
basic balancing test for informational privacy claims, weighing the 
governmental interest in the survey against the students’ privacy interests 
at stake.69 The court described the survey as “an attempt to obtain 
information directly related to the understanding and prevention of the 
social problems confronting today’s youth—a laudable goal, apparently 
pursued with the youths’ best interest in mind.”70 Meanwhile, “the privacy 
side of the balance” was lessened given the lack of evidence that the 
survey was not anonymous or that the school ever disclosed individual 
student’s personal information.71 Indeed, the survey results, “while 
publicly disclosed, w[ere] revealed only in the aggregate, in a format that 
did not permit individual identification.”72 Thus, while the C.N. court ruled 
against the informational privacy claim here, it left open whether the 
outcome might have been different had the school extracted students’ 
                                                                                                                          
63 Id. at 190 (finding no constitutional violation of the right to privacy and granting summary 
judgment in favor of a public school district that administered surveys as a means of collecting 
information to introduce social programs). 
64 Id. at 161. 
65 Id. at 161, 168–70. 
66 Id. at 167–69. 
67 Id. at 161, 175–77.   
68 Id. at 175, 181–82. 
69 Id. at 179–80. 
70 Id. at 181–82. 
71 Id. at 181. The court did find, however, that “the survey, as actually administered, was 
involuntary.” Id. at 174. 
72 Id. at 181. 
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information non-anonymously.73 Similarly, the court implied that had it 
been less clear that the school was extracting this information with the 
students’ “best interests in mind,” it might have let the claim go forward.74 
Should students ever have viable informational privacy claims arising 
solely from schools’ extraction of their personal information? Especially 
given the uncertainty over whether the informational privacy right 
generally protects information-acquisition alone, there are arguments that 
they should not. After all, even well-established constitutional rights, such 
as freedom of speech and freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, are often ratcheted down in the school setting.75 This ratcheting-
down has generally stemmed from the Supreme Court’s desire to preserve 
the core of students’ constitutional protections while also responding to 
schools’ needs to maintain safe and effective learning environments.76 
Such school needs are often at stake when public schools seek to extract 
students’ personal information. After all, public schools both educate 
students about numerous personal topics (including sex and drugs) and 
play an important role in protecting students’ health and safety. 
Information-extraction can be useful and important in performing these 
functions.  
Indeed, both Gruenke and C.N. can be viewed through this lens. In 
Gruenke, for instance, the swim coach’s concern that Leah was pregnant 
stemmed from Leah’s own complaints of nausea and low energy, 
combined with the coach’s observations that Leah frequently left swim 
practice to go to the bathroom and that her body was rapidly changing.77 
There is nothing to suggest that the coach’s interest was prurient; indeed, 
the coach’s first reaction was to have the female assistant coach speak with 
her and he also asked a doctor whether it would be safe for Leah to 
continue swimming competitively if she were pregnant.78 Similarly, 
nothing in C.N. suggests that the Ridgewood School District’s motives for 
administering the student life survey were improper. In fact, the survey 
was conducted at the behest of a group comprised of social service 
agencies that wanted to “survey Ridgewood’s student population to better 
understand their needs, attitudes and behavior patterns in order to use the 
                                                                                                                          
73 Indeed, in Rhoades v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 888, 899 (N.D. Ind. 
2008), the district court denied summary judgment to a school that administered a psychological 
assessment to high school students in a non-anonymous fashion. 
74 C.N., 430 F.3d at 181–82. 
75 Supra note 47. 
76 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332–34, 340–41 (1985) (balancing students’ Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections with the need for schools to maintain order and security, as well as an 
effective learning environment). 
77 Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2000). 
78 Id. at 296–97. 
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town’s programs and resources more effectively.”79 Education professor 
Kathleen Conn has pointed to cases like C.N. to argue that “[p]ublic school 
educators acting in loco parentis have a right and a responsibility to 
determine the sexual awareness of their students so that they can adopt 
curricula that teaches healthy ways of dealing with sexual language, 
information, and impulses.”80 
Of course, educators’ motives in extracting students’ personal 
information are not always so benign. In Wyatt v. Fletcher,81 a Fifth Circuit 
case decided in May of 2013, a student alleged that her softball coaches, 
prompted by animosity toward her, interrogated her about her sexual 
orientation, accused her of being in a sexual relationship with another 
female, and threatened the student by not allowing her to play softball until 
she told her mother about the relationship.82 There, allegations of malice 
were prominent. 
But even assuming that in most cases, educators are well-intentioned 
when they probe for students’ personal information, there are still reasons 
to recognize a counterveiling privacy interest on students’ part. Indeed, 
informational privacy concerns can be heightened in the public school 
setting precisely because of students’ youthfulness and school personnel’s 
power and influence over them. When school officials seek to extract 
information from students, students may not feel free to refuse to provide 
it, even if the questioning is theoretically voluntary. Here, too, Gruenke 
and C.N. are illustrative. Leah repeatedly refused to take a pregnancy test, 
even writing a letter to her coach denying that she could be pregnant, but 
she finally gave in and took the test.83 Similarly, in C.N., several students 
reported having the impression—accurately or not—that they would 
“receive a cut” if they did not fill out the survey.84   
Relatedly, when schools want students to provide information, they 
may not be motivated to emphasize that students can decline to do so. In 
C.N., although the principal did tell the school officials administering the 
survey that it was voluntary, the administrators spent much of their time 
instead focusing on “how best to get the students to take the survey 
seriously.”85 Tellingly, the survey instructions themselves did not even 
explicitly state that the survey was voluntary. Rather, they told the 
students:  
                                                                                                                          
79 C.N., 430 F.3d at 162. 
80 Conn, supra, note 8, at 150. 
81 718 F.3d 496, 499–501, 510 (5th Cir. 2013). 
82 Id. at 510–11; Wyatt v. Kilgore Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 6:10–cv–674, 2011 WL 6016467, at *1–
2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011). 
83 Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 296. 
84 C.N., 430 F.3d at 167. 
85 Id. at 165. 
 2015] SHOW AND TELL?: STUDENTS’ PERSONAL LIVES, SCHOOLS, AND PARENTS 715 
Today, during this period, you have an opportunity to express 
your views . . . . This survey should take 45 minutes to 
complete. Please take advantage of the full amount of time, 
since we will be using the entire period for this purpose. 
Please make no identifying marks on your survey. Please 
begin.86 
Such language, as the C.N. court noted, “echo[ed] what students might 
hear before mandatory state testing.”87 
Additionally, even when students do decline to provide information in 
response to school officials’ questioning, they still may feel that their 
privacy has been infringed by the encounter. In A Taxonomy of Privacy, 
Daniel Solove describes “information collection” as a distinct type of 
privacy invasion, and describes a particular practice of such collection—
“interrogation”—that has particular resonance for the public school 
context.88  Solove writes: 
Interrogation is the pressuring of individuals to divulge 
information. Interrogation has many benefits; it is useful for 
ferreting out information that others want to know.   
However, interrogation can create harm. Part of this harm 
arises from the degree of coerciveness involved. The Fifth 
Amendment privilege protects against highly coercive 
interrogation about matters with enormous personal stakes 
for the examined subject. However, for interrogation 
generally, the compulsion need not be direct; nor must it rise 
to the level of outright coercion. . . . Interrogation forces 
people to be concerned about how they will explain 
themselves or how their refusal to answer will appear to 
others. . . .  
Like disclosure, interrogation often involves the divulging of 
concealed information; unlike disclosure, interrogation can 
create discomfort even if the information is barely 
disseminated.89 
Not only are students likely to be concerned about how their refusal to 
answer will appear to school personnel, but the substance of the questions 
                                                                                                                          
86 Id. at 167. 
87 Id. at 175. 
88 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491–501 (2006) 
(discussing the harms of interrogation and its invasive nature in the face of excessively prying 
questions); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 38, at 2033 (defining “invasion of privacy” as an 
infringement on private facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, and acts to “engender[] social 
harms that exceed the associated social benefits”). 
89 Solove, supra note 88, at 500–01 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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themselves, particularly if they are explicit, may themselves also infringe 
students’ sense of personal privacy.   
The ways in which students’ particular sensitivities can heighten the 
informational privacy concerns raised by schools’ probing for their 
information suggest that perhaps, rather than ratcheting down the 
constitutional protection, courts should heighten it. Although the 
ratcheting-down model is certainly more common in the public school 
context, there is at least one arguable precedent for ratcheting-up: the 
treatment of Establishment Clause issues in public schools. The Supreme 
Court has suggested that public school students’ youth, impressionability, 
and susceptibility to pressure from the school community can increase the 
likelihood of an Establishment Clause violation. “The Court has been 
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment 
Clause in elementary and secondary schools,” the Supreme Court wrote in 
Edwards v. Aguillard.90 “Students in such institutions are impressionable 
and their attendance is involuntary. The State exerts great authority and 
coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because 
of the students’ emulation of teachers as role models and the children’s 
susceptibility to peer pressure.”91 Such concerns can easily translate over to 
situations in which public schools probe for their students’ personal 
information, and deserve to be weighed against the justifications for such 
school behavior.    
Given the general uncertainty over whether the informational privacy 
right covers information-acquisition alone—along with the particular 
questions about how the right should apply in the public school setting—
the informational privacy construct, while important, is certainly not a 
perfect stand-alone method for challenging public schools’ extraction of 
students’ personal information. Yet it rarely does stand alone. In almost all 
cases where such school behavior is challenged, another privacy-based 
claim is brought as well: that the school has violated not only the rights of 
the student, but also the rights of his or her parents. Accordingly, I now 
turn to this category of claims in Part II.B, and then look at the two species 
of privacy claims together in Part II.C to analyze the synergy between 
them. 
                                                                                                                          
90 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987). 
91 Id. at 584 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court emphasized the special 
characteristics of kindergarten through twelfth grade students in ruling that a middle school had 
violated the Establishment Clause by having a rabbi deliver the graduation ceremony’s invocation and 
benediction. 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“[W]e think the State may not, consistent with the 
Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children in this position. Research in 
psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure . . . .”). 
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B.  Familial Privacy   
1.  The Familial Privacy Right: An Overview 
In contrast to the informational privacy right’s fairly recent lineage, the 
notion that parents have a fundamental due process right to control the 
upbringing of their children dates back nearly a century. In the Supreme 
Court’s most recent discussion of this right—Troxel v. Granville92—the 
Court observed: 
The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer 
v. Nebraska, we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due 
Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a 
home and bring up children” and “to control the education of 
their own.” Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
we again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” 
includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control.”93 
This parental interest is often described as a privacy right of its own: a 
right to familial privacy. The First Circuit, for instance, has stated that 
“[t]he due process right of parental autonomy might be considered a subset 
of a broader substantive due process right of familial privacy.”94 Other 
courts have used similar terminology.95 
Despite the long history of the parental autonomy right, its contours 
remain somewhat murky. In Troxel, although the Court referred to this 
right as “fundamental,”96 its plurality opinion did not employ the 
traditional strict scrutiny test for claims involving infringements of 
fundamental rights, instead simply striking down the challenged 
Washington statute for non-parental visitation as “breathtakingly broad.”97 
Justice Thomas, while concurring, wrote separately to critique the plurality 
for its failure to articulate the standard of review, emphasizing that he 
would apply strict scrutiny here.98  
This omission was not an anomaly. Rather, the question about which 
                                                                                                                          
92 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
93 Id. at 65 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923)). 
94 Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 102 (1st Cir. 2008). 
95 See, e.g., Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the plaintiff had the 
right to choose private-school educations for her child under “the penumbra of familial privacy rights”). 
96 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. 
97 Id. at 67. 
98 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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standard of review to apply connects with underlying questions about what 
the right protects in the first place. As David Meyer has written: 
     In large part, the Court’s parental-rights cases remain 
profoundly murky regarding the balance they strike between 
private and communal interests in childrearing because they 
rest uncomfortably upon two competing and as-yet-
unreconciled metaphors: the family as a “private refuge” 
from a brutal or  indifferent community and the state as 
“protector” of children from a brutal or indifferent 
family . . . . 
     Subsequent cases have made it clear that the Court regards 
some form of heightened scrutiny as appropriate whenever 
the state intrudes significantly upon a parent’s basic decision 
concerning child rearing. In recent decades, the Court has 
stated repeatedly that a parent has a “fundamental liberty 
interest” in “‘the  companionship, care, custody, and manage-
ment of his or her children.’” And yet the Court in those 
cases, still torn between the competing metaphors of family 
as haven and as hell, stops short of embracing strict scrutiny 
as the governing  standard. 
     The Court has used the familiar language of strict scrutiny 
—“compelling” interests and “narrow tailoring”—in only a 
few of its cases dealing with the rights of parents. . . . In a 
much greater number of cases, the Court seems to apply a 
more free-form “reasonableness” test to government actions 
that impede a parent’s child-rearing authority, implicitly 
calibrating the level of scrutiny in each case to match the 
particular degree of intrusion upon the parents’ interests.99 
Meyer’s observation about reasonableness review certainly tracks 
courts’ approach to what is probably the most frequent conflict between 
parental autonomy and public schools: situations in which parents object to 
aspects of the school curriculum, and assert that their parental due process 
rights entitle them to opt their children out. (Such claims are often coupled 
with a free exercise objection to the challenged portion of the 
curriculum.)100 Although the Supreme Court has not decided a case like 
this, lower courts have consistently held that the parental autonomy right—
                                                                                                                          
99 David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 545–46 (2000) 
(footnotes omitted). 
100 See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008) (claiming violations of rights under 
the Free Exercise Clause and substantive parental and privacy due process rights where the student was 
presented with two books that portrayed parents of the same gender). 
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whether on its own or in combination with the free exercise right—only 
entitles parents to opt out of the public schools altogether, not to send their 
children to public school but then handpick the aspects of the experience to 
which they will be exposed. The Second Circuit rejected a father’s claim 
that he should be entitled to exempt his son from health education, stating 
that “Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny do not begin to suggest the 
existence of a fundamental right of every parent to tell a public school 
what his or her child will and will not be taught.”101 Other courts have 
framed the issue in similar terms.102   
Courts have likewise rejected parents’ constitutional challenges to 
other aspects of public school policies, such as attendance, dress, or 
community service requirements.103 As the Sixth Circuit broadly reasoned 
in Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School District104: 
Whether it is the school curriculum, the hours of the school 
day, school discipline, the timing and content of 
examinations, the individuals hired to teach at the school, the 
extracurricular activities offered at the school or, as here, a 
dress code, these issues of public education are generally 
“committed to the control of state and local authorities.”105  
Indeed, having found that no fundamental right is implicated by these 
conflicts, courts regularly apply rational basis review.   
Such reasoning has also usually been fatal to parental rights claims 
involving public schools’ extraction of students’ personal information, to 
which I now turn.   
2.  The Familial Privacy Right: Public Schools’ Extraction of Students’ 
Personal Information 
The familial privacy right has, so far, been an even weaker anchor for 
challenges to public schools’ extraction of students’ personal information 
                                                                                                                          
101 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2003). 
102 The First Circuit recently held out the possibility that if a school actually tried to indoctrinate 
students into a certain viewpoint—as opposed to simply exposing them to materials and perhaps trying 
to influence their views—that that could violate parental autonomy, the Free Exercise Clause, or both. 
However, it has never actually recognized a valid indoctrination claim, nor has any other court. Parker, 
514 F.3d at 105. 
103 See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a 
father’s claim that a middle school’s dress code was unconstitutional); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the school district where students and parents alleged that the district’s mandatory school 
uniform policy was unconstitutional); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 
694–95 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that the school’s refusal to allow students to attend 
classes part time violated students’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause, parents’ constitutional right 
to direct their child’s education, and students’ rights under state law). 
104 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005). 
105 Id. at 395–96 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975)). 
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than has the informational privacy right. In Fields v. Palmdale School 
District,106 for instance, the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected several parents’ 
claims that an elementary school had violated their familial privacy rights 
by conducting a psychological assessment of first, third, and fifth 
graders.107 The assessment, comprising four questionnaires, asked students 
to rate how often they experienced things like “[w]anting to yell at 
people,” “[c]an’t stop thinking about something bad that happened to me,” 
“[k]nown anyone who has or is being abused,” “[h]aving sex feelings in 
my body” and “[c]an’t stop thinking about sex.”108 Although the school 
had sought parental consent for the survey, the consent form did not 
indicate the sexual nature of the survey.109 The consent letter simply 
described the survey as having the goal of “establish[ing] a community 
baseline measure of children’s exposure to early trauma.”110 The parents 
argued that had they known of the “true nature” of the survey, they never 
would have consented to their children’s involvement, and that the survey 
had infringed their parental autonomy rights to decide how to expose their 
children to these sensitive topics.111   
The Fields court, however, used the curriculum-dispute cases 
described above to rule against the parents, stating that parents “have no 
constitutional right . . . to prevent a public school from providing its 
students with whatever information it wishes to provide, sexual or 
otherwise, when and as the school determines that it is appropriate to do 
so.”112 The parents did not bring a separate informational privacy claim on 
their children’s behalf, and the court did not consider the merits of such a 
claim.113 The court also did not consider whether familial privacy might 
have been infringed by the school’s asking of these questions because the 
case solely proceeded as a challenge to the school’s information-provision. 
Nor did the court consider whether familial privacy might have been 
infringed by the school’s asking of these questions.  The case solely 
proceeded as a challenge to the school’s information-provision.114 
The C.N. court rejected the Ridgewood parents’ familial privacy 
claims on similar grounds. The court characterized the parents as solely 
objecting to the questionnaire’s provision of information to their children: 
We recognize that introducing a child to sensitive topics 
                                                                                                                          
106 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). 
107 Id. at 1200. 
108 Id. at 1201–02, 1201 n.3. 
109 Id. at 1201. 
110 Id. at 1200 n.1. 
111 Id. at 1202. 
112 Id. at 1206. 
113 See id. at 1207 n.8. (“No claim is asserted that either the childrens’ or the parent’s rights were 
violated because the children were compelled to disclose personal or sensitive information.”). 
114 Id. at 1203. 
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before a parent might have done so herself can complicate 
and even undermine parental authority . . . . [But] [a] parent 
whose middle or high school age child is exposed to sensitive 
topics or information in a survey remains free to discuss 
these matters and to place them in the family’s moral or 
religious context, or to supplement the information with more 
appropriate materials. School Defendants in no way 
indoctrinated the students in any particular outlook on these 
sensitive topics; at most, they may have introduced a few 
topics unknown to certain individuals. We thus conclude that 
the survey’s interference with parental decision-making 
authority did not amount to a constitutional violation.115 
The court’s analysis was thus indistinguishable from the reasoning used in 
the curriculum-dispute cases. The court did not consider whether any 
additional family privacy interests are raised when the school is actually 
inquiring into students’ own personal and family lives.116 
The decision that came closest to exploring this question is Gruenke, 
where, in addition to raising an informational privacy claim on her 
daughter’s behalf, the student’s mother argued that the swim coach had 
violated her own familial privacy rights by trying so aggressively to 
ascertain whether her daughter was pregnant, without involving her in the 
process.117 The mother claimed that had the coach stayed out of the 
situation and allowed the family to handle it, they would have quietly sent 
Leah to live with her sister out-of-state, but the coach’s involvement 
precluded this by making “the family’s dilemma a topic of conversation for 
the school community.”118 Interestingly, two members of the three-judge 
panel were sympathetic to this claim, writing that “[s]chool-sponsored 
counseling and psychological testing that pry into private family activities 
can overstep the boundaries of school authority and impermissibly usurp 
the fundamental rights of parents to bring up their children, as they are 
guaranteed by the Constitution.”119 This reasoning echoed, and cited, the 
1973 conclusion of a Pennsylvania district court that a school’s drug 
prevention program, which included administering a questionnaire to 
students that asked them about their family relationships, infringed familial 
                                                                                                                          
115 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3d Cir. 2005). 
116 Unlike Fields, in which no informational privacy claim had been brought, Fields v. Palmdale 
School District, 427 F.3d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005), the informational privacy issue was squarely 
presented here. C.N., 430 F.3d at 184–85. The C.N. court, however, apparently viewed the extraction-
based arguments as solely implicating the students’ interests, and did not discuss how the extraction of 
such information might also infringe upon familial privacy. It is not clear whether the plaintiffs tried to 
make a separate argument along those lines. 
117 Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000). 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 307. 
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privacy.120 The Gruenke court ultimately concluded, however, that this 
family privacy right was not clearly established enough to overcome the 
coach’s qualified immunity.121   
This aspect of the Gruenke majority’s approach, however, has not 
gained much traction. In describing Gruenke five years later, the Third 
Circuit in C.N. characterized the mother as having argued “that the swim 
coach’s action deprived [her] of [her] right to make decisions concerning 
[her] child.”122 This incomplete description—which left out the Gruenke 
majority’s suggestion that school prying into private family activities can 
itself be problematic—helped the C.N. court to conclude that the 
Ridgewood survey had not violated familial privacy, because it had not 
seriously infringed upon parents’ authority to make decisions regarding 
their children.123   
Fields and C.N. have generated critical commentary from scholars 
arguing that the decisions insufficiently protected parental rights.124 
                                                                                                                          
120 Id. (citing Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 922 (E.D. Pa. 1973)). 
121 Id. Meanwhile, the third judge disagreed that there had been a familial privacy violation in the 
first place, writing that the claim here was simply that the coach’s  
discussion of Leah’s pregnancy with others and his failure to inform the Gruenkes of 
the pregnancy merely complicated the Gruenkes’ ability to make decisions 
concerning the pregnancy. . . . [But] the Gruenkes were free at all times to make 
whatever decision they pleased as to the outcome of Leah’s pregnancy, even after 
[the coach] discussed her condition with other parents or swim team members.  
Id. at 310 (Roth, J., concurring). Part of the divide here stems from a difference in the characterization 
of the mother’s familial privacy claim. The concurrence viewed it as a challenge to the coach’s failure 
to disclose the information about Leah to her parents—a type of claim discussed in Part II, and to 
which the author is similarly unreceptive in most circumstances. But the majority recognized that the 
mother’s claim also implicitly included a challenge to the coach’s probing for this information in the 
first place—an extraction-based claim that, as I argue further below, requires more solicitude. Id. at 
303, 306.  
122 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005). 
123 Id. at 184–85 (citing Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 309). 
124 See, e.g., Dahl, Surveys in America’s Classroom, supra note 8, at 143–44, 191 (“The effect of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fields v. Palmdale  was a virtual relinquishment of a parent’s ability to 
have a voice in what his or her child would be exposed to . . . . ”); Tara Dahl, Surveys in America’s 
Classrooms?  How Much Do Parents Really Know?  Some Further Perspectives, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 473, 
477–78 (2009) [hereinafter Dahl, Some Further Perspectives] (“[T]he Fields court failed to address the 
parents’ primary concern, that a nonacademic, sexually explicit survey was administered to very young 
students without parents informed consent.”); Elliott Davis, Unjustly Usurping the Parental Right: 
Fields v. Palmdale School District, 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1133, 
1134 (2006) (stating that Fields “ignores parental interests”); Beth Garrison, “Children Are not Second 
Class Citizens”: Can Parents Stop Public Schools from Treating Their Children Like Guinea Pigs?, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 147, 1999 (2004) (claiming that Fields demonstrates that the Protection of Pupil 
Rights Act will be ignored by courts); Jesse Fu, Note, The Researcher’s Second Laboratory: Protecting 
Our Children from Social Surveys in Public Schools in Light of Fields v. Palmdale School District, 80 
S. CAL. L. REV. 589, 603–09 (2007) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s opinions in Fields contained analytical 
flaws. . . . Specifically, though the court recognized that the claims are grounded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause, it failed to recognize the privacy claims under the 
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Commentators have not focused on the familial privacy concerns about, as 
the Gruenke court put it, “pry[ing] into private family activities,”125 much 
less the informational privacy aspects of the cases. Instead, the critiques 
either (1) proceed from the information-provision perspective in the Fields 
and C.N. decisions and then argue that surveying students about sex  
violates parental rights to decide how to expose their children to such 
information,126 or (2) focus on the argument that these children were 
improperly used as social research subjects without proper safeguards.127 I 
suggest, however, that the overlap between the informational and familial 
privacy rights in this context provides a useful additional lens for analyzing 
these cases. The next section explores this approach. 
C.  Harnessing the Synergy Between the Informational and Familial 
Privacy Rights 
Neither the informational privacy right nor the familial privacy right, 
standing alone, has been an ideal basis for challenging public schools’ 
extraction of their students’ information. The informational privacy claims 
bump up against the unresolved question of whether the right is violated 
when the government is only acquiring information for its own use without 
disclosing it further. The familial privacy claims run into the challenge of 
explaining precisely how schools infringe parents’ childrearing authority 
by asking their children personal questions, a difficulty heightened by the 
adverse precedents in the curriculum-dispute cases.   
Even though neither of these privacy rights fits perfectly on its own, 
they converge in an illuminating way when schools probe for information 
about students’ personal and family lives. Such probing strikes right at the 
intersection of informational and familial privacy, raising the potential for 
both students and their parents to feel that the school is intruding on, as the 
Supreme Court put it in Prince, the “private realm of family life.”128 Emily 
Buss has forcefully argued against Justice William Douglas’ famous 
dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder,129 in which he asserted that before Amish 
                                                                                                                          
Amendment—which are fundamental rights—are substantive due process rights.”); id. at 620–21 
(stating C.N. stands for the proposition that schools may evade statutory prohibitions by claiming a 
survey is voluntary). 
125 Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307. 
126 See, e.g., Dahl, Surveys in America’s Classroom, supra note 8, at 186 (“The court basically 
indicated that greater administrative efficiency allowed diminished parental rights.”); Dahl, Some 
Further Perspectives, supra note 124, at 478–79 (“[N]ot only does the Fields decision ‘affirm the right 
of the Palmdale School Districts to survey its students, but rather, it affirms the broad power of public 
schools to provide students with information they decide is educationally appropriate’. . . [and] to 
determine curriculum. . . . But this may be too broad a power.”). 
127 See, e.g., Fu, supra note 124, at 608–09 (noting that children are being used as human 
“research subjects” without proper protections).   
128 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
129 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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parents were permitted to remove their adolescent children from school, 
the state should ask the children themselves what they wanted.130 Buss 
states that “[a]rguably, the very asking of the question—‘Do you share 
your parents’ beliefs, Frieda?’—imposes some harm.”131 Specifically, 
“[s]uch a question raises the prospect of intra-family division . . . .”132 An 
even stronger version of this critique can be made against the questioning 
that occurred in C.N., where the school not only inquired into the details of 
students’ family lives, but also implied that there was a right way for 
family members to relate to one another, asking students to indicate 
whether they agreed that “my parents often tell me they love me,” “if I 
break one of my parents’ rules, I usually get punished,” and querying how 
many times a week the student’s family ate dinner together.133 Such 
questions not only raise the prospect of intra-family division, as Buss 
feared, but indeed seem likely to prompt students to question whether their 
family life is up to par. 
Even when schools are not explicitly asking about students’ home life, 
their probing into other aspects of students’ personal lives—romantic, 
recreational, and so on—still has the potential to encroach on students’ 
sense of personal privacy, their parents’ sense of autonomy in guiding their 
development, and the evolving parent-child relationship itself. Charles 
Fried has eloquently described the interconnectedness of informational 
privacy and intimacy, observing:  
[P]rivacy . . . is necessarily related to ends and relations of 
the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. 
Privacy is not merely a good technique for furthering these 
fundamental relations; rather without privacy they are simply 
inconceivable. They require a context of privacy or the 
possibility of privacy for their existence. . . . [P]rivacy is the 
necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as 
oxygen is for combustion. . . . [I]ntimacy is the sharing of 
information about one’s actions, beliefs, or emotions which 
one does not share with all, and which one has the right not 
to share with anyone. By conferring this right, privacy 
creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and 
love. . . . Privacy grants the control over information which 
enables us to maintain degrees of intimacy.134 
                                                                                                                          
130 See Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 53 (1999) 
(“While I share Douglas’s view that the Yoder decision is deficient in its account of children’s rights, I 
think Douglas’s cure is worse than the disease.”). 
131 Id. at 69. 
132 Id.  
133 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 2005). 
134 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477–78, 484–85 (1968). 
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In extracting personal information from students and infringing upon their 
own sense of privacy, schools may undermine the intimacy of the parent-
child relationship as well, influencing the decisions that students make 
about whether and how to discuss these matters with their parents.  
 Indeed, Fried’s account suggests that there is a synergy between the 
informational privacy and familial privacy challenges typically brought 
against schools’ extraction of students’ information—that, although courts 
tend to view the two claims in isolation, they are in fact intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing. Arguably, there is something of a hybrid right here: a 
right of informational privacy surrounding the family as a unit, as opposed 
to solely the individual student. Neil Richards has also more broadly 
articulated the potential overlap between informational and decisional 
privacy, arguing that “the informational/decisional binary is at best a fuzzy 
means of categorizing two quite related interests” in autonomy.135 Daggett 
also notes, in the related Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment context, 
that the PPRA can be viewed as protecting both students’ informational 
privacy and their parents’ familial and decisional privacy.136 
Focusing on the synergy between students’ informational privacy 
claims and their parents’ familial privacy claims also dovetails with 
another argument made by several family law scholars: that where 
children’s and parents’ interests converge as to a particular issue, the state 
should tread particularly lightly. Emily Buss, for instance, has written that 
in conflicts regarding the allocation of developmental control over children 
(such as decisions over whether a child will attend school or have regular 
visitation with grandparents), “[w]here the child’s views align with either 
the parents’ or the state’s, the child’s position should have special 
developmental force.”137 David Meyer similarly argues that “[t]he state’s 
power to intrude upon family life should be more narrowly confined when 
the state seeks to assert its values upon a family that is unified in its 
resistance.”138   
The convergence of the informational and familial privacy rights here 
suggest that schools should be particularly cautious when extracting 
personal information from students. When administering broad surveys, 
schools should be more cognizant of the potential privacy-based concerns. 
                                                                                                                          
135 Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1093, 1106–07 
(2006) (describing how, for example, certain seminal “decisional privacy” cases like Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), can also be read as informational privacy cases). 
136 Daggett, supra note 8, at 63. She writes that “[m]any . . . clearly view the PPRA as providing 
substantive parenting rights. . . . [Others] suggest[] that the statute in fact protects a sort of student 
privacy; namely protection from government collection of certain information. . . . This Article 
assumes that protecting both family privacy and student privacy are goals of the PPRA.” Id. 
137 Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 44. 
138 Meyer, supra note 99, at 580. 
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The PPRA provides an important starting point in requiring parental 
consent and/or notice and opt-out rights for such surveys, depending on 
whether the survey is “required.”139 But not only does the PPRA lack a 
provision for meaningful enforcement, it does not sufficiently protect the 
constitutional privacy interests here. It does not make clear when a survey 
counts as being “required,” and even when a survey is clearly required, 
there is still no obligation for the school to send a copy of it to each family, 
as opposed to (as in C.N.) just making it available for inspection at the 
school.140 
Meanwhile, at the individual level, which is not covered by the PPRA 
at all, schools certainly should not shy away from trying to acquire 
information when they feel that a student is being abused or neglected at 
home, or is otherwise facing a real threat to her well-being and safety. 
Similarly, in situations where students are in emotional distress and either 
they or their parents solicit the assistance of a school counselor or 
psychologist, it is unlikely that informational and familial privacy concerns 
will be simultaneously present. Under these circumstances, either the 
student or the student’s parents will be aligned with the public school. But 
in situations where both informational and familial privacy concerns are 
salient, and where there is no counter-veiling student-specific need to 
extract the information in question, schools should avoid probing for 
students’ personal information. Indeed, on top of the constitutional 
concerns that extracting such information can raise, schools that acquire 
such information can end up in a new quandary: what to do with it.   
III.  DISCLOSURE OF STUDENTS’ INFORMATION 
Once schools have learned sensitive personal information about a 
student—whether or not by their own affirmative steps—they must decide 
whether to share that news with the students’ parents. Here, the above-
described convergence between students’ informational privacy rights and 
their parents’ familial privacy rights breaks down, replaced by a 
divergence that puts schools in a bind: while disclosure risks infringing a 
student’s informational privacy, non-disclosure risks undermining the 
parents’ ability to direct the upbringing of their child.   
A.  Informational Privacy 
In some ways, the informational privacy questions surrounding public 
                                                                                                                          
139 See Daggett, supra note 8, at 59, 61. (“The bulk of PPRA gives parents consent of opting out 
rights to keep their child from child from participating in certain school activities, such as certain 
surveys and physical exams, which could generate sensitive information.”). 
140 See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that prior to 
the administration of the survey, the school made a copy of it available for parents to review). 
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schools’ treatment of students’ personal information become simpler upon 
moving from the extraction to the disclosure context. This situation maps 
more neatly onto the initial Supreme Court conception of informational 
privacy as protecting individuals from the government’s unauthorized 
disclosure of their personal matters. But this scenario also raises a new, 
vexing question of its own: do minors have any informational privacy 
rights regarding governmental disclosures to their parents?   
Courts have not reached consensus on this issue. In 2000, the Third 
Circuit endorsed the viability of an informational privacy claim regarding a 
police officer’s threat to disclose an eighteen-year-old man’s sexual 
orientation to his grandfather.141 This is distinguishable, however, not only 
because the man was an adult, but also because grandparents do not have 
the constitutionally-protected interest in childrearing that parents 
possess.142 Indeed, at least in the abortion context, the Supreme Court has 
specifically upheld parental notification and consent requirements out of 
deference to the importance of the parental role.143   
Additionally, some states require, or at least explicitly permit, 
healthcare providers to disclose information to a minor’s parents about the 
minor’s contraction of a sexually transmitted infection, alcohol or drug 
dependency, or need for mental health services.144 Such statutes tend to 
                                                                                                                          
141 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 192–93, 198 (3d Cir. 2000). 
142 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000) (stating that courts should give significant 
deference to parents’ decisions regarding their children’s relationships with their grandparents). 
143 See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 405 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
Utah statute that requires a physician to notify, if possible, the parents of a dependent, unmarried, 
minor female before performing an abortion). The Court emphasized the importance of the parental 
role, stating that “parents have an important ‘guiding role’ to play in the upbringing of their children, 
which presumptively includes counseling them on important decisions.” Id. at 410 (internal citations 
omitted). The Court has never ruled that a judicial bypass option is necessary for statutes requiring 
parental notification, although it has held it necessary for statutes requiring parental consent. See Ohio 
v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1990) (“[A]lthough our cases have 
required bypass procedures for parental consent statutes, we have not decided whether parental notice 
statutes must contain such procedures. . . . We leave the question open, because, whether or not the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires notice statutes to contain bypass procedures. H.B. 319’s bypass 
procedure meets the requirements . . . for parental consent statutes . . . .”). 
144 See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-508 (West 2014) (stating that when a minor seeks medical 
care for a sexually transmitted disease, “a physician or member of a medical staff may inform the 
spouse, parent, or guardian of any minor as to the treatment given or needed but shall not be obligated 
to do so. The information may be given to or withheld from the spouse, parent, or guardian without the 
consent and over the express objection of the minor”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124260 (West 
2014) (stating that minors, who are at least twelve years old, may consent to mental health treatment 
depending on their maturity level, as determined by a physician, but “the mental health treatment or 
counseling of a minor authorized by this section shall include involvement of the minor’s parent or 
guardian, unless the professional person who is treating or counseling the minor, after consulting with 
the minor, determines that the involvement would be inappropriate”); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
210/5 (West 2014) (“Any physician, advanced practice nurse, or physician assistant . . . who provides 
counseling to a minor patient who has come into contact with any sexually transmitted disease . . . may, 
but shall not be obligated to, inform the parent, parents, or guardian of the minor as to the treatment 
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place decision-making discretion in the hands of healthcare providers, not 
minors. These laws undermine the notion of a robust informational privacy 
right for minors vis-à-vis their parents.    
That said, numerous commentators have argued that minors should 
have a protected realm of informational privacy even with regard to their 
parents. Caitlin Cullitan, for example, has argued that strict scrutiny should 
apply whenever the state discloses (or requires others to disclose) 
information to a minor’s parents on sex-related issues, reasoning that 
“[r]efraining from disclosing a minor’s private information to a parent 
actually maintains the status quo in families, instead of impeding upon 
parents’ autonomy.”145  
Adam Kretz likewise argues that the Constitution should prevent 
schools from disclosing students’ sexual orientation to their parents.146 
Holning Lau similarly advocates a “categorical rule unique to children: the 
government should not out gay and lesbian youth unless the government 
shows that doing so prevents cognizable harms.”147 Indeed, Cullitan, Kretz, 
and Lau all argue that given the intensity of identity-development during 
adolescence, minors’ informational privacy rights should be stronger than 
those possessed by adults.148 “[A] special right is sometimes necessary for 
childhood contexts,” Lau reasons.149 Helen Gilbert similarly suggests that 
“minors are particularly vulnerable to the threat of disclosure of their 
personal information,” and that the informational privacy framework 
should take this into account.150 Benjamin Shmueli and Ayelet Blecher-
Prigat likewise emphasize the need for intra-family privacy, drawing upon 
domestic and international conceptions of privacy to argue that “children 
should have an individual right for privacy against their parents.”151 
So far, however, no court has actually ruled in favor of a minor 
claiming that her privacy rights were violated by a governmental disclosure 
to her parents. The closest a court came to doing so was in Nguon v. 
                                                                                                                          
given or needed.”); see Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is it Anyway? An Updated Model of 
Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 260 (2005) 
(“Rather than determining competence, healthcare providers have a responsibility for evaluating a 
patient’s decision-making capacity prior to obtaining valid informed consent.”).   
145 Cullitan, supra, note 8, at 459. 
146 Kretz, supra note 8, at 408–16. 
147 Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 
371 (2007). 
148 Cullitan, supra note 8, at 446, 450; Kretz, supra note 8, at 409–411; Lau, supra note 147, at 
370–71. 
149 Lau, supra note 147, at 370. 
150 Gilbert, supra note 35, at 1400–01. Like Cullitan and Lau, Gilbert also emphasizes that 
“minors’ identities are not fixed, but are instead malleable and subject to influence,” suggesting that 
society needs to give them room for independence. Id. at 1401. 
151 Benjamin Shmueli & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Privacy for Children, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 759, 763 (2011).   
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Wolf,152 where a California district court held that the student had a 
“[c]onstitutionally protected privacy right with respect to disclosure of her 
sexual orientation” to her parents.”153 But the court ultimately concluded 
that this right had not been violated here because the school principal was 
justified in telling the mother that the student had been physically 
demonstrative with another girl to explain why the student had been 
suspended for inappropriate displays of public affection on school 
grounds.154 The court added that “[i]f Charlene’s expressions of her 
sexuality had not risen to the level of IPDA, clearly [Principal] Wolf could 
not have gratuitously told her parents that she was gay or that she was 
engaging in displays of affection, within appropriate bounds, with another 
girl.”155   
Other courts have been less sympathetic to such claims. In Port 
Washington Teachers Association v. Board of Education,156 a district court 
in New York rejected the argument that a school policy to disclose 
students’ pregnancies to their parents violated the students’ constitutional 
rights.157 “No Court has created such a right to privacy for minors, and the 
Court here declines to do so as well,” wrote the court.158 The court 
reasoned that parental notification of pregnancy differed from parental 
notification of abortion, and added that courts in “parental notification 
cases have found that notification of abortion is far less burdensome than 
the consent to abortion situation.”159 It is unclear, however, whether the 
plaintiffs explicitly challenged the policy in informational privacy terms, 
or only framed their opposition as an abortion-specific decisional privacy 
claim.160   
The clearest defeat for the argument that minors have informational 
privacy rights against their parents came this past summer, in Wyatt v. 
Fletcher.161 In a two to one split, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument 
that a student’s privacy rights were infringed when her coaches disclosed 
                                                                                                                          
152 517 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
153 Id. at 1191. 
154 Id. at 1177, 1194. 
155 Id. at 1195. 
156 No. 04-CV1357TCPWDW, 2009 WL 47447 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2006). 
157 Id. at *7. 
158 Id. at *6. 
159 Id. at *7.   
160 The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case, but solely on the alternative grounds 
(also reached by the district court) that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Port Wash. Teachers’ Ass’n v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Port Wash. Union Free Sch. Dist., 478 F.3d 494, 502 (2d Cir. 2007). The court noted 
that “the remaining portions of [the district court’s] opinion turn out to have been unnecessary to its 
decision and may therefore be characterized as dicta.” Id. For a detailed critique of the district court’s 
decision, see Prober, supra note 8, at 559. 
161 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 496–97 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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her sexual orientation to her mother.162 A magistrate judge had let her case 
go forward, denying summary judgment on the grounds that the Fifth 
Circuit protected informational privacy, that the student had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her sexual orientation, and that there was a 
factual dispute as to whether her coaches had a legitimate interest in 
revealing her sexual orientation to her mother.163 Indeed, the lower court 
thought that the student’s rights were clearly established and that there was 
the potential to pierce the school officials’ qualified immunity.164 But the 
Fifth Circuit majority disagreed, ruling that there was “no clearly 
established law holding that a student in a public secondary school has a 
privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment that precludes school 
officials from discussing with a parent the student’s private matters, 
including matters relating to sexual activity of the student.”165 The court 
found that “the ‘disclosure’ here was only to the student’s mother; it was 
not discussed with other coaches, teachers, or students.”166   
The Wyatt dissent, by contrast, echoed the lower court’s argument that 
the student had alleged a violation of her clearly established constitutional 
rights.167 The dissent argued that the Fifth Circuit had recognized the 
concept of informational privacy, that this privacy right included sexual 
orientation, and that precedent compelled its extension to high school 
students.168 It concluded that the key question was “whether the coaches 
had a legitimate interest which outweighed [the student’s] right to 
privacy.”169    
Interestingly, the Wyatt majority seemed slightly open to the idea that 
it mattered whether the school officials had a legitimate interest in 
disclosing this information. After first rejecting the idea that the student 
had an informational privacy right vis-à-vis her mother, the majority 
nonetheless argued that “disclosure of [the student’s] relationship was in 
the interest of the student and became necessary only after [the student], 
allegedly influenced by [the older student with whom she was involved], 
violated team rules and policy, which were in place for the benefit and 
safety of students.”170 That the majority bothered to mention this indicates 
at least some sympathy with the idea that truly gratuitous disclosures 
would be problematic. 
                                                                                                                          
162 Id. 
163 Wyatt v. Kilgore Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 6:10–cv–674, 2011 WL 6016467, at *4, *5–6, *13,*14 
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011). 
164 Id. at *13–14. 
165 Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 499. 
166 Id. at 508. 
167 Id. at 510, 518 (Graves, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 513–14, 518. 
169 Id. at 514. 
170 Id. at 508. 
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Both Nguon and even Wyatt thus implicitly sketch out an approach that 
I develop further below: that the motivation and justification for the 
school’s disclosure should be an important part of the informational 
privacy analysis. Neither decision, however, discussed how students’ 
informational privacy rights should co-exist with parents’ own rights to 
direct their children’s upbringing—the other piece of the puzzle, to which I 
now turn. 
B.  Familial Privacy 
Schools that choose not to disclose students’ sensitive personal 
information to their parents certainly avoid any potential informational 
privacy claims on their students’ behalf. But in doing so, they open 
themselves to another risk: claims brought by parents alleging that the 
school’s secrecy interfered with their own rights as parents, thus violating 
their own familial privacy. 
The high-water mark for such claims is Arnold v. Board of 
Education,171 in which two sets of parents whose minor son and daughter 
conceived a child filed a lawsuit alleging that two school officials had 
coerced their children to seek an abortion and to keep the plan secret from 
their parents.172 The Eleventh Circuit agreed that “a parent’s constitutional 
right to direct the upbringing of a minor is violated when the minor is 
coerced to refrain from discussing with the parent an intimate decision,” 
concluding that the complaint “sufficiently state[d] a cause of action for 
invasion in the familial right to privacy.”173 The court explained that the 
school’s actions here, at least as described in the complaint, had interfered 
with parental authority by depriving the parents of the opportunity to instill 
their own values in their children.174 But the court emphasized that it was 
not requiring school officials to disclose students’ sensitive personal 
information to their parents; instead, it was merely prohibiting schools 
from “coerc[ing] minors to refrain from communicating with their 
parents.”175    
The Third Circuit picked up this thread in Gruenke, suggesting that the 
school swim coach had violated Leah’s mother’s familial privacy rights not 
only by “pry[ing] into private family activities”176 (as discussed above in 
Part II.B), but also by not notifying the mother about his concerns 
                                                                                                                          
171 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989). 
172 Id. at 308–09. 
173 Id. at 312 (“[A] parent’s constitutional right to direct the upbringing of a minor is violated 
when the minor is coerced to refrain from discussing with the parent an intimate decision . . . .”). 
174 Id. at 313. 
175 Id. at 314. 
176 Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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regarding Leah’s possible pregnancy.177 The court observed that the case 
presented “another example of the arrogation of the parental role by a 
school similar to, although not as egregious as, Arnold,” strikingly adding 
that it had “considerable doubt about [school counselors’] right to withhold 
information of this nature from the parents.”178   
The Third Circuit ruled more decisively against the parents in Anspach 
v. City of Philadelphia,179 in which the parents of a 16-year-old girl sued 
after a public health center gave their daughter the morning-after pill 
without notifying them.180 Their claim was accompanied by one brought by 
their daughter herself, who claimed that the defendants had violated her 
own rights to “parental guidance.”181 The court was unconvinced, writing 
that imposing a constitutional requirement on state actors to contact parents 
in such situations “would undermine the minor’s right to privacy and 
exceed the scope of the familial liberty interest protected under the 
Constitution.”182 Acknowledging its suggestion in Gruenke that school 
officials there should have consulted with the parents, the court pointed out 
that here, unlike in Gruenke, the minor had acted on her own initiative to 
seek out the center’s services.183 The plaintiffs had failed to plead any facts 
suggesting that the center “inserted itself” into the daughter’s decision or 
interfered with the parent-child relationship.184 “The real problem alleged 
by [the] [p]laintiffs [was] not that the state actors interfered with the 
Anspachs as parents; rather, it [was] that the state actors did not assist the 
Anspachs as parents or affirmatively foster the parent/child relationship,” 
the court explained.185 “However, the Anspachs are not entitled to that 
assistance under the Due Process Clause.”186 
Thus, just as no student has prevailed in claiming that a school violated 
her informational privacy rights by disclosing her sensitive personal 
information to her parents, no parent has prevailed in arguing that a school 
violated her familial privacy rights by not disclosing such information.187 
                                                                                                                          
177 Id. at 306. As discussed above, however, the Third Circuit ultimately held that there was no 
“clearly established” right here, and so qualified immunity still applied. Id. at 307; see supra note 106 
and accompanying text (stating the court’s decision that the “family privacy right was not clearly 
established enough to overcome the coach’s qualified immunity”). 
178 Id. at 306–07. 
179 503 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2007). 
180 Id. at 258. 
181 Id. at 260. 
182 Id. at 262. 
183 Id. at 270–71. 
184 Id. at 271. 
185 Id. at 266 (emphasis in original). 
186 Id.  
187 However, Arnold falls into a different category because the parents were not merely 
challenging the school’s non-disclosure, but also their affirmative efforts at concealment. Arnold v. Bd. 
of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 309 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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Does the difficulty of winning such claims —in either direction—make 
sense? Below, I argue that it does, but that clearer guideposts, stemming 
from a clearer underlying rationale, are needed. 
C.  Reconciling the Tension Between the Informational and Familial 
Privacy Rights 
The informational and familial privacy rights point in opposite 
directions when it comes to public schools’ disclosure of students’ personal 
information. Strong versions of both rights cannot co-exist here. 
Otherwise, disclosure to parents would simultaneously be prohibited and 
required. But the above discussion points toward a path for reconciling 
these two competing privacy interests: providing schools with broad 
discretion to use their own best judgment as to whether to disclose 
students’ personal information to their parents, with that discretion 
bounded by the students’ informational privacy right on one end and the 
familial privacy right on the other.  
Such an approach is analogous to the balance that the Supreme Court 
has struck in navigating the competing currents of the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses. Like the informational and familial privacy rights, 
these two constitutional protections sometimes converge but sometimes 
come into tension.188 The Supreme Court has held that although both the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses impose certain prohibitions, 
“‘there is room for play in the joints’ between the Clauses, some space for 
legislative action neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.”189 Within this space—which the 
Court has termed the “corridor between the Religion Clauses”190—the state 
can exercise its discretion. 
Similarly, the informational and familial privacy rights each impose 
limitations on how schools should handle students’ personal information. 
On the one hand, students’ informational privacy rights should prevent 
schools from disclosing their sensitive personal information to their parents 
                                                                                                                          
188 As Erwin Chemerinsky explains,  
To a large extent, the establishment and free exercise clauses are complementary. 
Both protect freedom of religious belief and actions. Many government actions 
would simultaneously violate both of these provisions. . . . Yet, there also is often a 
tension between the establishment and free exercise clauses. Government actions to 
facilitate free exercise might be challenged as impermissible establishments, and 
government efforts to refrain from establishing religion might be objected to as 
denying the free exercise of religion. 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1182–83 (3d ed. 2006) 
(footnotes omitted).   
189 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
190 Id. at 720. 
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without any legitimate justification. Even if minors’ informational privacy 
rights are weaker than those of adults, and even if such rights are further 
limited in the context of parental disclosure, minors should still be 
protected from truly arbitrary or malicious governmental disclosures of 
their sensitive personal information to their parents.   
This is where the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Wyatt fell short. It is 
hard to counter the majority’s conclusion that the privacy right invoked by 
the student was not “clearly established” in the Fifth Circuit at the time of 
the incident, as required to overcome the school officials’ qualified 
immunity.191 The dissent, in arguing to the contrary, did not address the 
lack of any precedent involving disclosure to a minor’s own parents, nor 
did it acknowledge the special issues raised by such a case.192 But the 
majority should have taken the opportunity to clarify the scope of this right 
going forward. Instead, it danced around the issue, first suggesting that this 
was an open-and-shut case and then briefly adding that the school officials’ 
disclosure seemed justified anyway.193 This latter conclusion, however, 
was based on one particular reading of heavily disputed facts: although the 
coaches claimed that they disclosed the information because the student 
was violating team rules and policies (due to her girlfriend’s influence), the 
student disputed all of this and claimed that the coaches were actually 
motivated by personal animosity toward her.194 The majority should 
instead have ruled that although there was no clearly established right at 
the time the coaches acted, thus dooming this particular claim, it was 
heretofore recognizing an informational privacy right on students’ part to 
be free from governmental disclosures of their sensitive personal 
information to any other individuals, including their parents, without a 
legitimate justification. The existence of such a legitimate justification 
should be a fact-specific inquiry. 
On the other hand, the family privacy right should prevent schools 
from encouraging—let alone coercing—students to keep secrets from their 
parents. The Arnold and Gruenke courts agreed that as a “matter of 
common sense,” if not constitutional duty, school personnel should 
encourage communication between students and their parents.195 While 
schools may not be required to “foster the parent/child relationship,” as the 
                                                                                                                          
191 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 510 (5th Cir. 2013). 
192 Id. at 510–18 (Graves, J., dissenting).  
193 See id. at 508 (majority opinion) (“[T]here is no controlling Fifth Circuit authority . . . showing 
a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment privacy right that prohibits school officials from 
communicating to parents information regarding minor students’ interests, even when private matters 
of sex are involved.”).  
194 Id. at 514–15 (Graves, J. dissenting). 
195 Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 
305, 314 (11th Cir. 1989)); Arnold, 880 F.2d at 314. 
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Anspach court noted,196 the familial privacy right should prevent schools 
from inhibiting it. Such allegations—just like allegations that a school 
disclosed a student’s sensitive personal information without a legitimate 
justification—should trigger a fact-specific inquiry. 
This approach leaves significant room for “play in the joints” between 
the informational privacy and familial privacy rights. Provided that schools 
are not disclosing students’ personal information to their parents without a 
legitimate justification, nor influencing them to keep such information 
secret from their parents, they should be free to exercise their pedagogical 
discretion as to how to handle each individual situation, at least without 
fearing liability from a constitutional perspective.   
Such a discretion-maximizing approach to disclosure decisions is not 
only analogous to the balance that the Supreme Court has struck in the 
religion context, but is also good policy. In these sorts of cases, the “right” 
resolution—the one that best serves the interests of the student and his or 
her family—is going to vary tremendously depending on family dynamics, 
the student’s own personality and inclinations, and the underlying 
information involved. Indeed, recent psychological research on adolescent 
privacy indicates how complex this topic is. Researchers have found that 
“[a]dolescents whose parents know relatively more about their day-to-day 
lives show lower levels of drug and alcohol use, delinquency, school 
problems, . . . depressed mood . . . higher self-esteem[,] and better school 
performance.”197 But it is unclear whether adolescents reap such benefits 
when their parents receive that information from others, or whether it is the 
child-parent sharing itself (as the result of a well-functioning relationship) 
that is particularly helpful.198 If the former explanation is correct, then 
schools’ disclosures of students’ personal information should often be 
beneficial, by providing parents with information that helps them “respond 
adequately to their child’s needs.”199 If, however, the latter explanation is 
more accurate—that sharing information with one’s parents increases 
and/or reflects a child’s sense of “belongingness”—then school disclosures 
could potentially undermine the parent/child relationship by depriving 
                                                                                                                          
196 Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, 503 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). 
197 Nancy Darling et al., Predictors of Adolescents’ Disclosure to Parents and Perceived Parental 
Knowledge: Between—and Within—Person Differences, 35 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 667, 667 
(2006). By the same token, “[k]eeping secrets from parents was associated with physical complaints 
and depressive mood in adolescence.” Catrin Finkenauer et al., Keeping Secrets from Parents: 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Secrecy in Adolescence, 31 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 123, 132 
(2002) [hereinafter Finkenauer et al., Keeping Secrets]. 
198 See Catrin Finkenauer et al., Perceiving Concealment in Relationships Between Parents and 
Adolescents: Links with Parental Behavior, 12 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 387, 389 (2005) [hereinafter 
Finkenauer et al., Perceiving Concealment] (describing the lack of research that investigates 
“concealment from the perspectives” of both parents and children). 
199 Id.  
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students of the chance to share information on their own terms200 and by 
making parents aware that their child is concealing information from 
them.201  
Moreover, researchers consider some degree of adolescent secrecy to 
be functional and developmentally appropriate.202 Not surprisingly, school 
counselors have identified “[t]he complexity of navigating a collaborative 
relationship with parents while respecting their responsibilities and 
honoring student confidentiality” as the most common, challenging 
dilemma that they face.203 By providing schools with a broad “corridor” 
between the informational and familial privacy rights, courts can 
encourage schools to take a student-specific approach, informed by the 
pedagogical discretion and expertise, when deciding whether and how to 
disclose information to parents. 
IV.  A NEW APPROACH TO PREVENT SCHOOL                                               
DISRUPTION OF THE FAMILY DYNAMIC 
Having looked separately at schools’ extraction and disclosure of 
students’ personal information, it is illuminating to step back and consider 
them together. For one thing, the two phenomena can be factually linked. 
The disclosure question sometimes comes up precisely because the school 
has sought out the information in the first place, as in Gruenke and 
                                                                                                                          
200 Some researchers have emphasized the importance of adolescents’ sense of control over which 
what sensitive information they want to share with their parents. See, e.g., Skyler T. Hawk et al., 
Adolescents’ Perceptions of Privacy Invasion in Reaction to Parental Solicitation and Control, 28 J. 
EARLY ADOLESCENCE 583, 605 (2008) (“Parents who trust their adolescents to disclose voluntarily and 
responsibly might consider making this good faith explicitly known, and contemplate the use of 
information-gathering strategies that afford teenagers a sense of control in sharing aspects of their 
personal lives.”). Relatedly, research suggests that “secrecy in adolescence may be a mixed blessing. It 
may facilitate the accomplishment of developmental tasks by enhancing adolescents’ emotional 
autonomy and independence, but at the same time, it may exert a prize in the form of physical 
complaints and depressive mood.” Finkenauer et al., Keeping Secrets, supra note 197, at 133. 
201 See Finkenauer et al., Perceiving Concealment, supra note 198, at 401 (“[P]arents’ perception 
of child concealment is associated with poorer parenting behavior toward their child.”). 
202 See Finkenauer et al., Keeping Secrets, supra note 197, at 124 (describing secrecy as helping 
“to facilitate the second individuation process, a developmental task that is at the core of 
adolescence”—namely, relinquishing dependence on one’s parents and becoming emotionally 
autonomous); Skyler T. Hawk et al., Mind Your Own Business! Longitudinal Relations Between 
Perceived Privacy Invasion and Adolescent-Parent Conflict, 23 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 511, 517–18 (2009) 
(“[A]dolescents’ own, increasing sense of empowerment contributes to their willingness to deal directly 
with privacy boundary turbulence. . . . It is important for parents, adolescents, and professionals 
assisting families to keep in mind that conflict over privacy should not be viewed as entirely negative. 
Instead, it likely plays an important role in openly negotiating changing social expectations for 
adolescents.” (citation omitted)).   
203 Nancy Bodenhorn, Exploratory Study of Common and Challenging Ethical Dilemmas 
Experienced by Professional School Counselors, 10 PROF. SCH. COUNSELING 195, 200 (2006).  
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Wyatt.204 The more information that schools extract, the more disclosure 
quandaries they will face. 
But the phenomena are also linked in a deeper way. Both raise core 
questions about how schools should approach their role in students’ 
personal and family lives. Indeed, both extraction and disclosure place 
pressure on the sense of the family as a private sphere. As discussed above, 
schools’ probing for students’ personal information—certainly when the 
requested information specifically touches on their parental relationships, 
but sometimes even when it relates to other aspects of their “outside 
school” lives—has the potential to undermine familial intimacy. And once 
the school has such information, both possible routes—disclosure and non-
disclosure—have the potential to alter the family dynamic as well. Either 
the school and the student share a secret of which the parent is unaware, or 
the school is acting as the intermediary between the student and his or her 
parents.   
Taken as a whole, the regime proposed by this Article seeks to 
minimize the potential for schools to insert themselves into familial 
relationships and distort the family dynamic. On the extraction front, under 
this Article’s approach, schools would refrain from probing for students’ 
sensitive personal information—whether by surveys or direct 
questioning—unless (1) they believe that a student is facing an actual 
threat to her well-being or (2) their involvement has been solicited by the 
student or parent. In the case of larger surveys, this second showing could 
be made by providing parents and students with an advance copy of the 
survey and requesting (in language making clear that they have a real 
choice) their affirmative consent for participation. Such restraint would 
further the overlapping informational and familial privacy rights implicated 
here.   
When it comes to disclosure, meanwhile, some distortion of the parent-
child relationship is inevitable. Schools should thus be able to make a case-
by-case analysis of which course best serves the student and familial 
interests here, provided that they have properly obtained the information in 
the first place (under the above-described standard), and they are neither 
influencing students to keep secrets from their parents nor disclosing such 
information without any legitimate reason for doing so.   
With these principles in mind, it is helpful to apply some of the cases 
discussed above. In the information-extraction context, Gruenke stands out 
as being fairly consistent with this Article’s approach, while Fields and 
C.N. fall short. The Gruenke court, while framing the issue slightly 
differently, did recognize that pressuring a student into taking a pregnancy 
                                                                                                                          
204 In both cases, the school administrators took affirmative action to question students after 
suspicions of pregnancy or homosexuality arose. Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 500–01 (5th Cir. 
2013); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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test (a form of information-extraction) and “pry[ing] into private family 
activities” placed a serious imposition upon the privacy interests of the 
student and her parents.205 This Article’s approach would similarly find a 
valid informational privacy claim here, because (1) there was insufficient 
evidence that the student was facing an actual threat to her well-being; and 
(2) the coach’s involvement was not solicited by either the student or her 
parent. Although the second point is obvious, the first point is a closer one, 
given the strong advisability of medical care during pregnancy. It is 
certainly possible to imagine a situation where a school official genuinely 
fears that a student has no idea that she is pregnant and is concerned for her 
(and her potential child’s) health and safety. In such circumstances, it 
would be permissible under this Article’s approach for the school official 
to raise the possibility with the student in a non-probing manner. (Indeed, 
the official could likely do this without directly prying for answers, in 
which case there may be no actual information-extraction at all.) Here, 
however, the coach went far beyond mentioning the possibility to the 
student. He tried to discuss sex and pregnancy with her, and even pressured 
her into taking an actual pregnancy test, not to mention the disclosure of 
his concerns to other teammates and their parents.206 The Third Circuit 
correctly ruled in favor of the student’s informational privacy claim.207 
By contrast, both Fields and C.N. did not give sufficient consideration 
to the informational privacy interests implicated by the way in which the 
defendant school districts conducted the respective surveys about 
extremely intimate topics. (To be fair, in Fields, the plaintiffs themselves 
failed to bring an informational privacy claim.)208 Under this Article’s 
approach, there would be a valid informational privacy claim against both 
school districts because (1) there was no evidence of a particularized threat 
to any student’s well-being and (2) neither the students nor the parents 
solicited the schools’ involvement in these very personal topics. In these 
cases, while the first point is incontestable, the second point is at least 
slightly closer, given this Article’s suggestion that with appropriate notice 
and consent, school surveys can be permissible. But here, neither survey 
met that bar. The notice itself was insufficient under this Article’s 
standard. In Fields, parents were not provided with copies of the surveys 
(or even given a full description of what they entailed);209 in C.N., the only 
way for parents to see them was to review a copy in the school offices, an 
inconvenient option used by a very small percentage of the parents.210 The 
                                                                                                                          
205 Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307. 
206 Id. at 296.  
207 Id. at 308.  
208 Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1207 n.8. (9th Cir. 2005). 
209 Id. at 1200–01. 
210 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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consent arrangements were also lacking: in Fields, the consent was not 
meaningful (given the incomplete description of the survey);211 and in 
C.N., no consent form was distributed to parents, and the students were 
made to feel that the survey was mandatory.212   
In the information-disclosure context, meanwhile, the courts’ rulings in 
favor of the defendants in both Nguon and Anspach—despite the opposite 
fact patterns in these cases—are both consistent with this Article’s 
proposed approach. Nguon challenged the disclosure of a student’s 
personal information to her parents,213 while Anspach challenged the non-
disclosure214—but in both cases, the state officials acted within the broad 
zone of discretion identified by this Article: they did not disclose 
information without any legitimate reason for doing so, nor did they 
influence minors to withhold this information from their parents. And, in 
both cases, there had been no improper extraction of the information in the 
first place: Charlene Nguon was observed engaging in public displays of 
affection with her girlfriend,215 and Melissa Anspach asked for the 
morning-after pill itself.216 Accordingly, both cases “played in the joints” 
between the informational and familial privacy rights. Wyatt, by contrast, 
is the more troubling case here, both because the school coaches allegedly 
extracted the information about her sexual orientation improperly 
(interrogating her about her relationship with another woman) and because 
the Fifth Circuit suggested that there may be no limits on schools’ ability 
to disclose students’ personal information to their parents.217 Wyatt did, 
however, include some language suggesting that the reasons for a school’s 
disclosure may be relevant, and future courts should expand on this 
point.218 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is no way for schools to shield themselves from learning about 
students’ personal and family lives. Students simply spend too much time 
at school, and develop too many relationships there, for schools to remain 
unaware of anything beyond pure academic performance. Nor would such 
unawareness even be desirable. We want schools to ask questions when 
they believe that a student is facing a real threat to her well-being, or when 
a student—or her parent—initiates the school’s involvement. In other 
                                                                                                                          
211 Fields, 427 F.3d at 1201. 
212 C.N., 430 F.3d at 175–76. 
213 Nguon v. Wolf, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
214 Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, 503 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2007). 
215 Nguon, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1182–85.  
216 Anspach, 503 F.3d at 259.  
217 Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 509–10 (5th Cir. 2013). 
218 Id.  
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circumstances, however, the overlapping informational and familial 
privacy concerns should prompt more restraint on schools’ part to avoid 
inserting themselves into the delicate family dynamic. Provided that 
schools exercise this restraint, they should have a wide zone of discretion 
to decide whether to disclose students’ personal information to their 
parents, as long as they remain within the corridor of neither pressuring 
students to keep secrets from their parents nor disclosing students’ personal 
information without a legitimate reason for doing so. Taken as a whole, 
this Article’s proposed regime will best further the alternately converging 
and diverging informational and familial privacy rights, and reduce the 
potential for school distortion of the family dynamic.   
  
